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5	TELA	) MUR 5625		
6	Aristotle	International, Inc.		
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1	IV.				
3	v.	RECOMMENDATIONS			
5	I. ACTIONS RECOMMENDED				
6	Find probable cause to believe Aristotle International, Inc. ("Aristotle") knowingly and				
7	willfully violated 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4),				
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### II. BACKGROUND

This matter concerns a knowing and willful violation of the commercial sale and use provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, ("the Act") and the Commission's implementing regulation. 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4); 11 C.F.R. § 104.15. On December 8, 2005, the Commission found reason to believe that Respondent, Aristotle International, Inc., ("Aristotle") knowingly and willfully violated 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) and authorized an investigation based on information suggesting that Aristotle downloads individual contributor information, specifically the individual's aggregate contribution history to federal campaigns (hereinafter referred to as "FEC data") from the Commission's online public records and provides the data through its product, Campaign Manager 5 ("CM-5"), which Respondent describes as a "sophisticated campaign management software program for campaign committees." See Reply Brief at 45. Beginning in April 2004, CM-5 contained a feature designated the "Donations" tab, which users could access in order to obtain the downloaded FEC data. Aristotle later renamed it the "Compliance/Vetting" feature (hereinafter referred to as the "C/V feature") in August 2004. CM-5 is sold by contract to its customers. Until September 25, 2009, the only way Aristotle's customers could access the FEC data

- through the C/V feature was by purchasing CM-5.1 The information further suggested that
- 2 Aristotle marketed the C/V feature by explicitly touting its fundraising benefits, despite its
- 3 knowledge of the Commission's position that such activity would violate the sale and use
- 4 provision of the Act and the Commission's regulations. See Advisory Opinion 2004-24.
- 5 Aristotle's original promotional materials refer to the C/V feature and the FEC data contained
- 6 in it by noting the ability to compare how much contributors have given to other campaigns:
- 7 "When soliciting a contribution, Campaign Manager 5 will tell you exactly how much the
- 8 prospect has given to others, which suggests how much you should ask for. Never again leave
- 9 money on the table by asking for too little, or the wrong amount, from a qualified prospect."
- 10 See Complaint, at Exhibit 1, p. 2.
- The factual record developed during the investigation shows that beginning April 1,
- 12 2004 through September 25, 2009, Aristotle sold FEC data exclusively through its software
- product; and, that from April 1, 2004 through at least November 2, 2005, Aristotle marketed
- the feature as a solicitation tool. Beginning in August 2004. Aristotle began incorporating
- 15 warnings to its customers regarding the restrictions on the sale and use of FEC data (hereinafter
- 16 referred to as "disclaimers") on some software product and materials related to the product.<sup>2</sup> It
- was not until November 2, 2005, that all marketing materials contained the disclaimers.
- 18 See Attachment 1. Our investigation also revealed that the 2004 user manual for CM-5

As of September 25, 2009, Aristotle posts the information for free on its website.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Beginning in August 2004, Aristotle included the following warning on the software product and most, but not all, materials related to the product: "FEC DATA WARNING!!! Any information copied, or otherwise obtained, from any FEC report or statement, or any copy, reproduction, or publication thereof, filed under the Act, shall not be sold or used by any person for the purpose of soliciting contributions or for any commercial purpose, except that the name and address of any political committee may be used to solicit contributions from such committees." A PowerPoint presentation appearing on Aristotle's website in November 2005 contained a screen shot of the feature, without a disclaimer, next to the following language: "When soliciting a contribution, Campaign Manager 5 will tell you exactly how much the prospect has given to others, which suggests how much you should ask for." See Attachment 1.

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- highlighted the C/V feature of the software product stating, "Want to know how much to ask
- 2 from your prospects? FEC and state contributor lists are now fully integrated into the
- 3 Fundraising screens so you can know everything about your prospect's history of contributions
- 4 to others." The language in the user manual was not deleted until January 2005, which is after
- 5 Aristotle was notified of National Geographical & Political Software's ("NGP") complaint
- 6 filed in this matter. Id.

By letter dated June 11, 2009, we served the General Counsel's Brief ("GC Brief"), incorporated herein by reference, to counsel representing Respondent. The GC Brief recommends that the Commission find probable cause to believe Aristotle knowingly and willfully violated 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) based on two distinct theories of liability. Under the first theory, Aristotle obtains FEC data from the Commission's online public records, and then sells the data to its customers through the sale of CM-5. These actions constitute a per se commercial purpose, and do not meet the regulatory exemption at 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(c) ("the media exemption"), because Aristotle's software is not a communication similar to a newspaper, magazine, or book and the principal purpose of inclusion of the data into its software upgrade is for commercial purposes, i.e., to sell its CM-5 software. The second theory is that Aristotle intended for its customers to use the data for solicitation as shown by both the functioning of the software, which provides its customers with an individual's aggregate contribution history thereby making it possible for campaigns to ask a current or prospective donor for larger donations based on their previous giving history to other campaigns, and its marketing of the software and the language in its user manuals. This theory is further supported by the failure to include disclaimers warning its customers of the restrictions on the sale and use of FEC data both

- internally on the product and externally on materials related to the product at the time the software was introduced.
- On July 28, 2009, after granting Respondent's request for a twenty-seven day extension 3 4 to file a response, Respondent submitted its Reply Brief, along with a request for a probable cause hearing, to the Commission. The Reply Brief argues that the C/V feature is not within the 5 6 scope of Section 438(a)(4), because the feature itself is not sold to anyone, does not include the names and contact information of contributors, is intended for compliance purposes only, and 7 disclaimers now appear internally on the product and externally on materials mentioning the 8 feature. Respondent further argues that its inclusion of the FEC data in CM-5 is protected by the 9 First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as, recent 10 MURs and Advisory Opinions permitting for-profit sale of FEC data by other entities, and that 11 the Commission's advice to the regulated community regarding the scope of 2 U.S.C. 12 § 438(a)(4) is ambiguous. In addition, Respondent argues that it has not committed a knowing 13 and willful violation of the Act. Last, Respondent argues in its Reply Brief that the Commission 14 should encourage innovations like the C/V feature. On February 17, 2010, Respondent submitted 15 a Supplemental Reply Brief alleging that the complaint should be dismissed based on language 16 17 in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. \_\_\_, 130 S. Ct. \_\_\_ (Jan. 21, 2010) stating that "[t]here is no precedent supporting laws that attempt to distinguish between 18 corporations which are deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those which are not." 19 Id., slip op. at 36. According to Respondent, 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) and the media exemption 20 regulation at 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(c) "distinguish media and non-media corporations by 21 specifically exempting media corporations from 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4)'s prohibition on speech. 22 Therefore, under the Citizen United analysis, the Commission may not impose this prohibition 23

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- on non-media corporations like Aristotle." Supplemental Reply Brief at 6. On August 5, 2009,
- the Commission approved the hearing request. On September 23, 2009, a probable cause
- hearing was held in accordance with the Commission's policy published at 72 Fed. Reg. 64919
- 4 (Nov. 19, 2007). In response to Commissioners' questions, counsel for Respondent stated,
- 5 among other things, that the initial marketing of the C/V feature was a "mistake." See MUR
- 6 5625 PC Hearing Transcript at 6 and 24-25. Counsel also stated that the only way a committee
- obtained access to the FEC data in the C/V feature was through a commercial sale or commercial
- 8 use. Id. at 19.

As discussed below, the Reply Brief, Supplemental Reply Brief, and the information obtained during the probable cause hearing fail to rebut the evidence set forth in the GC Brief establishing that Aristotle sold the FEC data in contravention of the Act and the Commission regulations, and that it explicitly marketed the software feature as a solicitation tool.

Accordingly, we recommend that the Commission find that Aristotle International, Inc.

14 knowingly and willfully violated 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4)

### III. <u>ANALYSIS</u>

A. Aristotle International, Inc.'s Commercial Sale and Use of Individual Contributor Information Copied from Commission Sources Violates 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4)

The commercial use and sale provision at 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) sets forth the

Commission's duty to make public the reports and statements filed with it for copying and inspection by the public, with the exception that any information copied from the reports or

statements may not be sold or used by any person for the purpose of soliciting contributions or

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...within 48 hours after the time of the receipt by the Commission of reports and statements filed with it, make them available for public inspection, and copying, at the expense of the person requesting such copying, except that any information copied from such reports or statements may not be sold or used by any person for the purpose of soliciting contributions or for commercial purposes, other than using the name and address of any political committee to solicit contributions from such committee. (emphasis added). Id.

2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4).

The Commission promulgated regulation 11 C.F.R. § 104.15 to implement the statutory prohibition. Part (a) of the regulation prohibits "any person" from selling or using FEC data for soliciting contributions or for commercial purposes. 11 C.F.R. 104.15(a). Part (b) of the regulation clarifies the term "soliciting contributions" as to include soliciting any type of contribution or donation, such as political or charitable contributions. Part (c) of the regulation, exempts the use of the FEC data in news media and books from the statutory prohibition when certain conditions are present. 11 C.F.R. § 104,15(c). The regulation states "the use of information, which is copied or otherwise obtained from reports filed under 11 C.F.R. part 104, in newspapers, magazines, books or other similar communications is permissible as long as the principal purpose of such communications is not to communicate any contributor information listed on such reports for the purpose of soliciting contributions or for other commercial purposes." Id. The regulatory exemption is referred to as the "media exemption" and it calls for a two pronged test to decide whether FEC information is sold or used for commercial solicitation or any purpose: first, whether the communication is similar to a newspaper, magazine or book, and second, whether the principal purpose of the communication is for other than soliciting contributions or for other commercial purposes. FEC v. Political Contributions Data, Inc., 943 F.2d 190, 195 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1991).

Aristotle's principal arguments are that its C/V feature does not violate the Act or the 1 2 Commission's implementing regulation because the feature is designed so that it could not be easily used as a prospecting or list-making tool, the feature does not provide the names and 3 addresses from FEC sources, the disclaimers now appear on the product and on materials related 4 to the product, and Aristotle meant for its customers to use the FEC data for compliance 5 nurposes only. See Reply Brief at 13-18. Respondent does not claim to be a media entity, nor 6 7 does it claim that its activities are exempt from the prohibition based on the media exemption at 8 11 C.F.R. 104.15(c). Probable Cause Hearing Tr. at 27. 9 Respondent's arguments are premised on its selective reading of Federal Election Commission v. Political Contributions Data, Inc., 943 F.2d 190 (2nd Cir. 1991), and its 10 11 avoidance of the court decisions in Federal Election Commission v. International Funding 12 Institute, 969 F.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1992) and Federal Election Commission v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 13 523 F. Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1997). The Legi-Tech court concluded that the "sale or use" prohibition set forth in Section 438(a)(4) applies to any individual or organization that uses 14 information obtained from FEC reports as part of a commercial sale. See Legi-Tech. at 530 15 ("[t]he exception [to 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4)] is where the principal purpose of the use of this 16 information is the solicitation of contributions or the commercial sale of the information 17 itself')(emphasis added). Moreover, Aristotle's arguments disregard the "media exemption" set 18 forth in the Commission's regulation at 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(c) and essentially ask the 19 Commission to create a vague and unsupported compliance exemption. 20 Aristotle's sales of the FEC data were for a commercial purpose within the meaning of 21 the Act, because it initially sold the software product with explicit instructions on how to use the 22 C/V feature as a solicitation tool, and until September 25, 2009 the only way its customers could 23

- get access to the FEC data in the C/V feature was by purchasing the software product.
- 2 Moreover, Aristotle's C/V feature is not similar to a newspaper, book or magazine, within the
- 3 meaning of Part (c) the regulation, rather it is a campaign management software program with
- 4 fundraising features, and therefore is not exempt from the statute. In addition, the restriction on
- 5 the commercial sale and use of FEC data as set forth in the statute and the Commission's
- 6 implementing regulation is constitutional on its face and as applied to the facts of this matter.
- 7 The statute is no broader than necessary to protect the important governmental interests of
- 8 promoting disclosure of campaign contribution information while not chilling the protected
- 9 speech of third parties. The regulation is rationally related to the purpose of the statute, and
- 10 accommodates the competing interest of promoting disclosure of campaign contribution
- information with the protection of private citizens' privacy and the property interest of the
- 12 political committees. Moreover, the statute and regulation as applied to the facts in this matter
- do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because Respondent has not
- 14 demonstrated that similarly situated individuals are being treated differently and that the
- 15 differential treatment is not justified. Respondent ignores key facts of the other enforcement
- 16 cases to which it cites, including the fact that other respondents' activities did not include the
- 17 sale of FEC data to customers. Last, the Respondent's constitutional challenge also fails
- 18 because the broad language in Citizens United cited by Respondent in its Supplemental Reply
- 19 Brief, does not address 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) or the Commission's implementing regulation
- 20 specifically and the analysis of Citizens United applies a different standard of scrutiny than
- 21 would be applied to restrictions on the use of FEC data for commercial purposes. We address
- 22 these issues more fully below.

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1 2	1. The Commercial Sale and Use Provision at 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) Applies to Any Contributor Information Derived from Commission Sources
3 4	The language of the statute is clear and addresses two distinct uses of Commission data:
5	(1) for the purpose of soliciting contributions, or (2) for commercial purposes. 2 U.S.C.

7 Respondent, through counsel, has stated that the feature was used for commercial purposes.

8 See MUR 5625 Probable Cause Hearing Transcript at 18-20. Respondent also believes that the

§ 438(a)(4). Both the courts and the legislative history have touched on one or both aspects.

9 C/V feature demonstrates the software company's "technological prowess." Id. at 37.

Nevertheless, Aristotle argues that Section 438(a)(4) has consistently been interpreted by the courts to be limited to sale or use of contributor names and contact information for prospecting purposes. Aristotle further argues that because it does not provide the names and addresses of contributors, "[t]he compliance/vetting feature does not have the potential to cause the harassment of any contributor or the invasion of a contributor's privacy." Reply Brief at 50 and at 20 citing to 117 Cong. Rec. 30057 (daily ed., Aug. 5, 1971) reprinted in Legislative History of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, at 581(1981).

While the cases in this area of the law have generally arisen in the context of contributor names and addresses, the commercial sale of contributor information is not limited to names and addresses, but includes any contributor information. See 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) and 11 C.F.R. § 104.15. Moreover, the more recent case law has explained that the term "commercial use" includes not only commercial solicitation, but also the commercial sale of the information.

See Federal Election Comm'n v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 523, 530 (D.D.C. 1997).

Respondent argues that the term "or for commercial purposes" as set forth in the statute is ambiguous. Respondent contends that, according to the legislative history of the statute and the case law, the term does not mean that FEC data can never be sold. Rather, Respondent argues

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that the term means that the sale or use of contributor names and contact information for 1 2 prospecting purposes is prohibited. See Reply Brief at 20-21 and 55. The primary legal support cited by Respondent for the proposition that the commercial use restriction is ambiguous is FEC 3 v. Political Contributions Data, 943 F.2d 190 (2nd Cir. 1991). In PCD, the Second Circuit 4 5 overturned the District Court for the Southern District of New York by finding PCD's use of FEC data permissible. The court's decision also directly overruled AO 1986-25 in which the 6 7 Commission determined that PCD's use of FEC data was commercial and therefore barred by 8 the Act. PCD collected FEC data and sorted the data by congressional district and by employer and sold the lists to the public to "show how financial contributions support the current political 9 superstructure, particularly with respect to the advantage enjoyed by incumbents over 10 11 challengers" and to "facilitate research into the reason why contributors, both as individuals and 12 on behalf of their affiliated companies, favor one candidate or another, particularly in light of 13 their congressional committee assignments." PCD at 193. Aristotle also cites this case for the proposition that the absence of contributor contact information and the inclusion of disclaimers 14 places the sale of the Commission data outside the scope of the scope of Section 2 U.S.C. 15 § 438(a)(4). See Reply Brief at 21. However, Aristotle ignores the basis for the Second 16 Circuit's holding, i.e., that PCD's use of the data was similar to a newspaper, book or magazine 17 - although not traditional media, it was close to being a purveyor of news. PCD at 196. The 18 court noted that the lack of mailing addresses and phone numbers made it certain that the 19 reports will be used for informative purposes, further placing PCD's reports within the media 20 exemption. "Since none of PCD's publications is of the type that could infringe on the 21

contributors' privacy interests, the publications at issue may be sold without violating

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1 § 438(a)(4) of the FECA." PCD, 943 F.2d at 198. Thus, the PCD court's holding applied the media exemption, rather than relying on any purported ambiguity in the Act. 2

3 Aristotle also ignores the criticism of the PCD decision by the court in Legi-Tech: "[i]n attempting to avoid the constitutionality issue, the Political Contributions Data court read the 4 phrase "or for commercial purposes" out of the statute. Legi-Tech, supra at 531. "Giving effect to only the solicitation component of Congress's proscription on solicitation or commercial use 6 7 would not protect all of the substantial interests that Congress identified, such as the political parties' intellectual property interest." Id., at 534. 8

In Legi-Tech, supra, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the Commission's motion for summary judgment, finding that the sale of subscriptions to the Campaign Contribution Tracking System (CCTS) violated the commercial use provision of Section 438(a)(4). Legi-Tech sold subscribers lists of donors from FEC data specifically so that Legi-Tech's customers could solicit those donors. Thus, Legi-Tech clearly violated both the intent and the text of the Act. With respect to the solicitation theory, the Legi-Tech court cites a use similar to the use alleged by the complainant, NGP, in the instant case as a violation of the Act. "The Teamsters used the CCTS to monitor contributions by its membership and, when it perceived 'the possibility of getting more contributions' from certain of its members, it would solicit contributions from those members." Id. at 526-527. This also closely matches the purpose of the C/V feature as described in Aristotle's original marketing material.

There are two additional published cases interpreting Section 438(a)(4). In the earliest case, the court found that defendants who sold mailing lists based on FEC tapes containing the names of donors violated the Act. FEC v. American Int'l Demographic Serv., Inc., 629 F. Supp. 317 (E.D.Va. 1986). In 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

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- 1 Circuit, sat en banc to hear a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 438(a)(4). FEC v. Int'l
- 2 Funding Institute, 969 F.2d 1110, (D.C.Cir. 1992). The court held that the statute was not
- 3 subject to strict scrutiny and that it did not violate the First Amendment on its face or as applied.
- While the American Int'l Demographic Serv., Inc. and IFI cases dealt primarily with the sale of contributor lists consisting of names and/or contact information of contributors, these
- 6 cases support our recommendations in this matter. Although the nature of the FEC data being
- 7 sold is different, i.e., names and addresses versus contribution histories, Aristotle's actions in
- copying FEC data and then selling it to customers is similar to the acts of the defendants in these
- 9 cases. It was the information itself that Aristotle was selling, and therefore, its replication of the
- information in its software product was the primary focus of its activity. See Legi-Tech, at 530
  - (Despite the fact that Legi-Tech's parent corporation was a diversified media company, it was
- Legi-Tech's actions which failed to the meet the media exemption at 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(c), in
- part, because it provided subscribers with information copied directly from reports filed with the
- 14 Commission; Legi-Tech's sale of the contributor information itself, rather than educating the
  - public, was the primary focus of its activity). Furthermore, given that Aristotle's customers have
- 16 the identifying information of the contributor in its own database, the chances that a contributor
- 17 would be solicited or re-solicited for a contribution are increased by using the FEC data. A
- 18 contributor giving a modest amount could be targeted for additional funds. As stated in
- 19 Aristotle's marketing materials, "Never again leave money on the table by asking for too little, or
- 20 the wrong amount from a qualified prospect." See Complaint, at Exhibit 1.
- 21 Aristotle's arguments are factually flawed as well. It argues that as designed the C/V
- 22 feature does not have list-making capabilities, and therefore, does not enhance solicitation of
- 23 contributors. See Reply Brief at 11 and 18; see also MUR 5625 Probable Cause Hearing

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- 1 Transcript at 21. However, the C/V feature does enhance a customer's ability to solicit
- 2 contributors, and therefore infringes on a contributor's privacy interests, because the contribution
- 3 histories are matched with the names and addresses input by the customer. The customer can
- 4 then use the Commission's data to harass prospective donors by soliciting those who have given
- 5 more to other campaigns, not just their existing donors. This is precisely the activity proscribed
- 6 by 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4); see also 117 Cong. Rec. 30057 (daily ed., Aug. 5, 1971) reprinted in
- 7 Legislative History of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, at 581(1981).

Respondent's narrow focus on their product's lack of list making ability is also unwarranted. Neither the statute nor the regulation contain, much less define, the term list broker. Moreover, the commercial sale and use prohibition does not distinguish between types of individual contributor information, only between political committee information and individual contributor information: "... any information copied from such reports or statements may not be sold or used by any person for the purpose of soliciting contributions or for commercial purposes, other than using the name and address of any political committee to solicit contributions from such committee." (emphasis added) 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4); see also 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(a). Nor has the Commission differentiated between different types of contributor information (e.g., names and addresses versus contribution histories). AO 1980-78 (Richardson) and AO 1980-101 (Weinberger) (campaign solicitations referencing political committee information – not individual contributor information – derived from FEC reports permissible): see also AO 1989-19 (Johnson) (Commission draws a distinction between political committee contribution information and individual contribution information -- proposed sale of copies of pages from Receipt and Disbursement Reports containing only contributions from other political committees permissible); AO 1995-09 (NewtWatch)(Commission approved request to make

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limited contributor information obtained from FEC sources available to the public on requestor's

- 2 website for free. The information would be available at no cost, and thus, was not clearly for a
- 3 commercial purpose. In addition, the proposed lists did not contain sufficient information on the
- 4 individuals to generate solicitations.) In sum, Aristotle provides no principled basis for
- 5 distinguishing its sale of the contribution histories from the sale of the names and addresses.

### 2. Aristotle Sold FEC Data Through the C/V Feature of CM-5 for Commercial Purposes Within the Meaning of the Statute and Regulation

Respondent argues that it does not sell FEC data because when the C/V feature was first included in CM-5, the cost of the software product was not increased. Reply Brief at 45. This argument fails because the only way Aristotle made the FEC data available to its customers was through their purchase of CM-5 until September 25, 2009. In other words, its customers had to purchase CM-5 to access the FEC data. Moreover, the nature of Aristotle's business is a commercial enterprise that produces computer software for the management of political campaigns, including increasing their fundraising effectiveness. As described in its Reply Brief, "...Aristotle provides committees with tools to gain an advantage in campaigns while making it easier for them to comply with the Commission's regulations." Reply Brief at 62-63 (emphasis added).

Aristotle's argument that it did not sell the FEC data, or that the FEC data is "incidental" to its sale of its software is also inconsistent with its initial marketing strategy. When CM-5 was first launched, one of the main selling points of the upgrade was the customer's ability to access a contributor's aggregate donor history through the C/V feature for the purpose of fundraising, or as explicitly stated in the marketing materials to get customers to purchase its upgrade: "Reason #1: Raise More Money." See GC Brief at 7-9; Complaint, at Exhibit 1. In addition, the

- PowerPoint presentation on Aristotle's website continued to tout CM-5 as a fundraising tool until
- 2 November 2005 (more than 18 months after CM-5 was first launched in April 2004).
- 3 See Attachment 1. Respondent acknowledges that the C/V feature was used to show off its new
- 4 CM-5 product. See MUR 5625 Probable Cause Hearing Transcript at 37. Moreover,
- 5 Respondent's senior management expected that the C/V feature would give new customers a
- 6 reason to purchase CM-5. See Reply Brief at 12, and at Attachment A, D. Phillips Affidavit at
- 7 ¶ 27. Respondent acknowledges that the initial marketing, to the extent to which it touted the
- 8 new C/V feature as a solicitation tool was a "mistake" and that those statements regarding
- 9 solicitation in the marketing materials had not been reviewed by counsel. See MUR 5625
- 10 Probable Cause Hearing Transcript at 6-7, 24-25; see also Reply Brief at 60, and at Attachment
- 11 A, D. Phillips Affidavit at ¶ 26.
- Respondent also argues that the term "commercial use" should only apply to situations
- involving commercial solicitation, in which a list of names for potential solicitation is created, as
- interpreted by the court in *PCD*, supra. Reply Brief at 21-23. Even under Respondent's narrow
- interpretation of the term "commercial use." its own activities are prohibited by the statute, given
- its admission that the feature can be used for solicitation purposes, even with the added
- 17 disclaimers. See MUR 5625 Probable Cause Hearing Transcript, at 24-25.
- As set forth in the GC Brief, the lack of disclaimers on the software product and materials
- 19 related to the product is further evidence that the intended principal purpose of the feature is to
- facilitate solicitation, as stated in its marketing materials, not compliance. GC Brief at 9-14.
- 21 The lack of disclaimers strongly suggests that FEC data was being sold to facilitate fundraising

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Respondent misconstrues the argument in the GC Brief as asserting a separate violation for the lack of initial disclaimers. The lack of disclaimers is not a violation itself, but rather further proof of the C/V feature's original and true purpose – solicitation.

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- 1 from existing donors, as well as from prospective donors. The contracts to purchase CM-5
- 2 lacked a disclaimer specific to the prohibitions on the sale and use of FEC data until at least
- 3 August 2004, and in some instances as late as February 2005. GC Brief at 11-12. Given that the
- 4 C/V feature was the main thrust of Respondents advertising of CM-5, and that the feature was
- 5 used to entice customers to purchase the upgrade, appropriate clear warnings from the start
- 6 would have helped demonstrate that the feature was not intended as a solicitation tool as
- 7 Respondent alleges.

Moreover, lack of warnings has no bearing on whether Aristotle's sale of FEC data constituted a commercial use. The statute does not permit the commercial sale or use of contributor information whether or not it is accompanied by a disclaimer stating the statute's sale or use restriction. The courts though have considered the presence of disclaimers in determining whether the communication would likely be used to solicit contributions. See PCD, supra, and Legi-Tech, supra. Since the C/V feature failed to include disclaimers for the first four months it was launched to the public, and the evidence demonstrates that Respondent sold the data with explicit instructions on how to use the FEC data for solicitation, the facts of this matter are in contrast to the facts of the case upon which Aristotle primarily relies, e.g., PCD, discussed supra at Section III.A.1 (disclaimers appeared on PCD's communication initially and there was no evidence that PCD marketed its communication as a solicitation tool).

Respondent maintains that its inclusion of the FEC data in the C/V feature of its software is for compliance purposes. Respondent's arguments that the C/V feature is for compliance purposes only and that it deters harassment because it does not copy contact information from Commission sources is flawed for various reasons.

From the outset, Aristotle's purported compliance purpose was in direct contradiction to 1 its initial promotional materials and 2004 user manual, which specify how campaigns can use the 2 3 FEC data to solicit contributions from contributors by noting how much they gave to other campaigns, and with the failure to include disclaimers on the product and related materials at the 4 time the software was introduced. The 2004 User Manual highlighted the new feature as 5 follows: "Want to know how much to ask for from your prospects? FEC and state contribution 6 7 lists are now fully integrated into the Fundraising screens so you can know everything about your prospect's history of contributions to others." Unlike its claims that its marketing of the 8 feature as a solicitation tool was limited to only four months, in actuality the marketing 9 continued from April 2004 through November 2005, as evidenced by a PowerPoint presentation 10 appearing on its website on November 2, 2005. See Attachment 1 ("Reason #1: Raise More 11 12 Money"). The evidence shows that C/V feature was intended to allow customers to use FEC data to 13 enhance their ability to solicit contributions from prospects, as well as from existing donors, 14 which is precisely the type of activity 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) seeks to prevent. GC Brief at 13-14. 15 According to Respondent, the feature can still be used for solicitation purposes, even with the 16 presence of disclaimers on the screen. See MUR 5625 Probable Cause Hearing Transcript at 17 24-26. 18 Furthermore, while Aristotle's marketing materials and 2004 user manual highlighted 19 how to use the C/V feature as a solicitation tool, the revised marketing materials and user manual 20 do not provide the same level of detail to its customers on how to use the information for 21 compliance purposes. See Reply Brief at Attachment C, February 2005 User Manual ("FEC 22 Compliance Note: Campaign Manager 5 makes a very limited subset of FEC information 23

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available for compliance purposes only, such as insuring against accepting excessive or illegal

2 contributions. The data may also be used to refuse or reject contributions from donors who give

3 to those with whom you may not wish to be associated").

Respondent's contention that the C/V feature was intended for compliance purposes is further undercut in two ways. First, contributions made to state campaigns are fed through the feature. When a customer inputs the name and address of a targeted contributor into the C/V feature, all federal state and PAC aggregate contribution histories are displayed simultaneously. See Complaint at Exhibit 1. Given that some states do not have limitations on amounts donated by individuals to state campaigns, an individual's contribution history to some state campaigns would not be used for compliance purposes, as there are no limits to check. Second, the names and addresses of potential contributors (from lists the committee purchased), not necessarily contributors who have already donated to a campaign, can be searched through the feature. See MUR 5625 Probable Cause Hearing Transcript at 10-11, 22, 30. Therefore, it is less likely that a federal political committee would use the C/V feature to obtain a potential contributor's contribution history for compliance purposes, because the individual has not yet donated to the campaign. Rather, a potential contributor's contribution history to other federal campaigns would more likely be used for solicitation purposes, as Respondent expressly advertised in its early marketing materials and original user manual. See Complaint, at Exhibit 1, p. 2; see also 2004 Campaign Manager 5 User Guide, at 16. The only explanation Aristotle gives for how the FEC data might be used for its purported compliance purposes is the possibility of checking donors' aggregate contributions:

"information about a particular, existing donor's aggregate contributions to all federal political

committees is extremely useful in avoiding receipt of illegal or excessive contributions from

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- donors who have reached their aggregate election cycle contribution limits under 2 U.S.C.
- 2 § 441a(a)." Reply Brief at page 11, note 5. All donations that recipient campaigns receive
- 3 should be recorded in the campaign's database, thus a campaign would have no need to use FEC
- 4 data to determine whether a donor has exceeded the contribution limit to that particular
- 5 campaign. Therefore, Aristotle's purported compliance purpose is more likely in reference to the
- 6 individual biennial limit. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(3). A contributor, however, is responsible for
- 5 staying within the appropriate contributions limits under the Act, and should be aware of his or
- her own donation history. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1) and (3). Thus, the individual should be
- 9 primarily responsible for checking that he or she is not over the biennial limit.<sup>4</sup>

Enforcement matters involving violations by campaign committees for the receipt of individual biennial contribution limits, Section 441a(a)(3), rarely arise. When such a violation is noted, it has principally been in the "family contribution" context (see, e.g., MURs 5321(Minnesotans for Janet Robert), MUR 5453 (Giordano for US Senate), MUR 5685 (Turnham for Congress) and MUR 5138 (Ferguson for Congress) where the excessive contribution results from a single contribution from an individual. This feature would do nothing to prevent this type of violation. On its face, the contribution check would establish that the biennial limit had been exceeded. Given the large size of the individual aggregate biennial limit, it is not surprising that such violations are so rare that the benefit of this upgrade for compliance purposes is minimal. Similarly, the Reply Brief provides no explanation as to how the C/V feature aides campaigns in avoiding receipt of illegal contributions. Evidence of illegality of a contribution would appear on the face of the check and therefore the campaign treasurer would

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The biennial limit is indexed for inflation in odd-numbered years. The 2009-10 limit is \$115,500. This limit includes up to: \$45,600 in contributions to candidate committees, and \$69,900 in contributions to any other committees, of which no more than \$45,600 of this amount may be given to committees that are not national party committees. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.5(b)(1).

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presumably know by examining the check that it is an illegal contribution, e.g., contributions

2 from corporate treasuries, and would not require computer software. See 11 C.F.R. § 103.3(b).

The only evidence available on how the feature is being used by its customers, is the

- tracking performed by Aristotle between November 8, 2007 and October 22, 2008. See Reply
- 5 Brief at Attachment A, D. Phillips Affidavit at ¶ 30. According to Aristotle, only three
- committees were tracked using the feature, and no explanation is provided as to how those
- customers used the feature. See MUR 5625 Probable Cause Hearing Transcript at 7-8. While
- the feature was disabled from October 22, 2008 until July 2009, Aristotle received no inquiries
- 9 as to why it was not functioning. See Reply Brief at Attachment A, D. Phillips Affidavit at ¶ 31.
- 10 The scarcity of use of the feature by its customers further undercuts Aristotle's argument that the
- 11 feature is an important compliance tool.

Respondent's Commercial Sale of FEC data is not Protected by the "Media Exemption" at 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(c), and Therefore is not Exempt from the Statute

The Commission's regulations articulate an exception for the use of FEC data in

- 17 "newspapers, magazines, books or other similar communications ... as long as the principal
- 18 purpose of such communications is not to communicate any contributor information listed on
- 19 such reports for the purpose of soliciting contributions or for other commercial purposes."
- 20 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(c).
- The first prong of the "media exemption" is not met because Aristotle's CM-5 software
- 22 product is not akin to a newspaper, book, or magazine, nor is it akin to an online news
- information service. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(c). The CM-5 software product is a campaign
- 24 management software program with fundraising features, including the C/V feature. See Reply
- 25 Brief at 45 and 63. CM-5 was marketed as a software product which will enhance political

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- committees' fundraising capabilities, thereby gaining an advantage over other campaigns. Reply
- 2 Brief at 62. The C/V feature gave customers a new reason to purchase CM-5, and the feature
- 3 was highlighted in the initial marketing materials. See Complaint, at Exhibit 1, ("5 Reasons Why
- 4 Campaigns Choose Campaign Manager 5," "Reason #1: Raise More Money"); See 2004
- 5 Campaign Manager 5 User Guide, at 16 ("Want to know how much to ask for from your
- 6 prospects? FEC and state contributor lists are now fully integrated into the Fundraising screens
- 7 so you can know everything about your prospect's history of contribution to others.").
- 8 Moreover, Aristotle is not arguing that it is a media entity. See MUR 5625 Probable Cause
- 9 Hearing Transcript at 27.
- Nor is the second prong of the exemption met, because, as discussed *surpa*, Aristotle's initial marketing of the product and initial failure to warn customers about the restrictions on the sale and use of FEC data establish that the principal purpose of the incorporation of the FEC data into CM-5's C/V feature is to solicit contributions.
- The key point is that the C/V feature is not designed to inform the public. Unlike MUR 14 5155 (TRKC, Inc.), the C/V feature was sold, not made available to the public without charge 15 until September 25, 2009. Furthermore, TRKC is an Internet news and tracking service, 16 17 whereas, CM-5 is a campaign management software product designed to increase the fundraising effectiveness of its customers. Similarly, MURs 6065 (PoliticalBase.com) and 6053 (Huffington 18 Post.com) are distinguishable because they are news and opinion websites which provided the 19 contributor information for free to the public. In PCD, supra the court equated a "similar 20 communication" to a newspaper, book, or magazine as a communication that furthers debate on 21

public issues. See PCD, at 195. As a campaign management software product designed to

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- increase the fundraising effectiveness of its customers, CM-5 is not a communication similar to a
- 2 newspaper, book, or magazine as defined by the regulation or the courts. See id.

### B. The Commission's Advice to the Regulated Community Regarding the Commercial Sale and Use Provision Has Been Clear and Unambiguous

### 1. Advisory Opinion 2004-24

The Commission's opinion in 2004-24 is important to the determination of this matter, because it stands for the proposition that the inclusion of historical contribution data for individual donors taken from the FEC's Web site and incorporated into a campaign management software upgrade sold to political committees would be prohibited under the Act's restriction on the sale or use of such contributor information. See AO 2004-24. Respondent argues that the General Counsel's Reliance on AO 2004-24 is misplaced. However, Respondent's argument overlooks the crucial fact that Aristotle conducts activity identical to the activity in AO 2004-24, i.e., collecting contributor information from the Commission's public records and including it as part of a software upgrade sold to customers. NGP and Aristotle are two leading campaign software producers and are fierce competitors in the campaign software industry. On June 10, 2004, NGP requested an advisory opinion from the Commission regarding a potential upgrade to their campaign software. NGP proposed to "offer our clients the ability to automatically see the contributions that their donors have made to other candidates, PACs and party organizations."

AO Request at 1. This feature would allow campaigns to ask their own donors for the maximum amount of money that the donor has given to other campaigns in the past.

Respondent attempts to distinguish AO 2004-24 from the facts of this matter based on its software configuration (e.g., that list-making is not possible with the C/V feature). See Reply Brief at 48. Contrary to Respondent's assertions, even though its software does not enable list-

- 1 making, the C/V feature had, and has, the capability of subjecting individual contributors who
- 2 have not yet contributed the maximum permissible amounts to the invasion of privacy and
- 3 harassment of targeted solicitations for specific amounts of money, based on information
- 4 obtained from FEC public records and accessed through software sold by Aristotle, precisely the
- 5 circumstance that 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) was designed to prevent. See discussion, supra, at 7, 12 -
- 6 13. As the Commission set forth in AO 2004-24, "the purpose of restricting the sale or use of
- 7 information obtained from FEC reports is to protect contributors from having their names sold or
- 8 used for commercial purposes..." (emphasis added). AO 2004-24 at 2.
- 9 In AO 2004-24, the Commission found that these circumstances constitute a commercial
- use and that commercial uses of FEC data are prohibited. *Id.* This reasoning applies regardless
- of whether the customer uses the data for solicitation purposes. Because the factual
- circumstances here are materially indistinguishable from those presented in AO 2004-24, the
- 13 Commission should apply the same reasoning to evaluate Aristotle's activity.
- 14 The Commission opined that because NGP intended to obtain information from the
- 15 FEC's online public records and include the information in a software upgrade, such a use would
- be commercial and thus barred both by the pertinent statute and regulation. AO 2004-24, at 3.
- 17 However, the wording of this section of the AO was changed from the original draft language,
- 18 which included the following sentence: "Such use is for a commercial purpose because NGP is a
- 19 for-profit company that sells and services NGP Campaign Office for a profit." Draft AO at 4.
- 20 By contrast, in the final version of the AO, the sentence is truncated to read simply: "Such use is
- 21 for a commercial purpose." Respondent argues that this language change supports their position,
- because a for-profit company can permissibly use the FEC data. This is incorrect. The language
- change instead made it clear that the advisory opinion's reasoning was not limited to for-profit

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- companies, and did not change the basic proposition that the inclusion of the data into a software
- 2 upgrade constitutes a commercial use. It is irrelevant whether an entity is a for-profit
- 3 organization, because even a non-profit organization might violate the Act if it uses the data for a
- 4 commercial purpose.
- In an attempt to distinguish its sale and use of contributor information from NGP's
- 6 proposal, Aristotle argues that it has provided the FEC data for "lawful compliance purposes."
- 7 Reply Brief at 48-49. This distinction is immaterial though since the Commission determined in
- 8 AO 2004-24 that commercial sale of a software upgrade that includes FEC data constitutes a
- 9 commercial use of FEC data, regardless of its ultimate purpose.
  - C. Section 438(a)(4) Does Not Violate Respondent's First Amendment Freedom of Speech Rights or its Customer's Freedom of Association Rights

Respondent contends that the enforcement of the commercial use and sale restriction violates its First Amendment freedom of speech rights by prohibiting the limited publication of contributor information. Reply Brief at 50. Respondent further maintains that "[t]he campaign's freedom of association under the First Amendment is also impacted if they are not allowed to use the contribution information for vetting to determine whether to associate with a particular candidate." Reply Brief at 50, note 19. Respondent argues that the C/V feature deters corruption. Specifically, the Reply Brief states: "[t]he information in the compliance/vetting feature 'deters actual corruption' by limiting the possibility of an excessive contribution by a contributor and 'the appearance of corruption' by the candidate for accepting an excessive contribution." Reply Brief at 51, citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976). "Accordingly, applying the prohibition of 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) to Aristotle's dissemination of contribution information by the compliance/vetting feature contravenes Congress' stated purposes for making the information available and is therefore unconstitutional." Id. Last, Respondent argues that

- 1 "[b]ecause the compliance/vetting feature does not disseminate contributor information that
- 2 could be used to harass contributors, there is no governmental interest in applying 2 U.S.C.
- 3 § 438(a)(4) restrictions to CM5." Reply Brief at 51.
- 4 Enforcement of 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) only prohibits Aristotle from selling this
- 5 information for commercial purposes; it does not limit any campaign's ability to use the
- 6 information for appropriate purposes. Congress' desire to prevent commercial use of the
- 7 financial disclosures is not mutually exclusive with their desire to deter corruption. As the court
- stated in Legi-Tech, "... prohibiting the commercial trade of this information preserves the
- 9 effectiveness of the private campaign financing system by reducing the discouraging effects of
- 10 compelled disclosure on the willingness of individuals to finance political discourse." FEC v.
- 11 Legi-Tech, 967 F. Supp. 523, 533 (D.D.C. 1997)(citations omitted). The mere fact that the
- information made public is later reproduced in a format constituting speech does not
- automatically mean that Congress has forfeited all of its power to regulate the commercial use of
- that information. See Legi-Tech, supra at 534 (citations omitted).
- 15 The Commission is required to make reports and statements filed with it available for
- public inspection, except that any information copied from such reports or statements may not be
- 17 sold or used by any person for the purpose of soliciting contributions or for commercial
- purposes, 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4). When determining whether the statute is constitutional as
- applied to the facts of this case, or on its face, the court will look to whether, "the restriction
- 20 further[s] 'an important or substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of
- 21 expression' and [is] 'no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular
- 22 governmental interest involved." Legi-Tech, supra at 532, citing IFI, supra at 1114. An
- 23 intermediate scrutiny standard applies when determining the constitutionality of the statute,

- because there exists a government compelled disclosure of information for a particular purpose 1 and a prohibited use of that information for other purposes. See id. citing IFI, supra at 1114 2 (because there was no pre-existing right to use another political committee's contributor lists to 3 solicit contributions, the use restriction of Section 438(a)(4) does not directly restrict a person's 4 5 first amendment right to solicit contributions for a political cause, and therefore, Section 438(a)(4) is not subject to strict scrutiny). In other words, the statute in no way restricts anything 6 7 but the use to which one may put the compulsorily disclosed information. See IFI, supra at 8 1115, citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984) (the Supreme Court applied only intermediate scrutiny to a restriction on the use of information that the government had 9 10 commanded to be disclosed). Applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to the First Amendment 11 challenge of 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4), the statute serves the important governmental interests of 12 protecting a political committee against losing the economic value of its contributor list merely because it must be publicly disclosed and it protects contributors from unwanted solicitation. 13 14 See IFI, supra at 1116 (citations omitted). Given that the statute does not ban soliciting all together, but merely requires that the data is obtained from a non-FEC source, the statute is no 15 16 broader than necessary to protect the important governmental interests while not chilling the protected speech of third parties. See IFI, supra at 1118 and 1119; see also Legi-Tech, supra at 17 533. Beyond the question of harassment, as explained by the pertinent case law, "[w]ithout the 18 use restriction of § 438(a)(4), innumerable entrepreneurs would, ... be able freely to appropriate 19 to themselves part of the value of the contributor lists compiled by reporting political 20 21 committees." IFI, at 1117, (citations omitted). 22
- The Commission's interpretation of the statute is reasonable and the regulation is fully

  consistent with the plain meaning of the text of the statute and in accordance with Congressional

- intent. See Legi-Tech, at 530. The Commission's implementing regulation, 11 C.F.R. § 104.15
- 2 is also entitled to deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
- 3 Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); see also National Republican Congressional Committee v. Legi-
- 4 Tech, 795 F.2d 190, 194 (1986) ("statutes agencies administer should be interpreted by the
- 5 agencies before the courts interpret them" (citations omitted)). The regulation is rationally
- 6 related to the purpose of the statute, and accommodates the competing interest of promoting
- 7 disclosure of campaign contribution information with the protection of private citizens' privacy
- and the property interest of the political committees. See Legi-Tech, supra at 530. The scope of
- 9 the restriction is no greater than necessary to protect the substantial governmental interests. See
- 10 id. Therefore, the statute and regulation are constitutional on their face.
- In its Supplemental Reply Brief, Respondent makes an overly broad constitutional
- 12 challenge to the statute and the regulation, arguing that prohibiting Aristotle from publishing
- 13 FEC data is discriminatory because the media exemption allows "so-called media corporations"
- to publish the same information. The result, Aristotle argues, is a violation of Aristotle's First
- 15 Amendment rights. The basis for Respondent's argument is dicta from the recent Supreme Court
- 16 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 130 S. Ct. [Jan.
- 17 21, 2010) which states that "[t]here is no precedent supporting laws that attempt to distinguish
- between corporations which are deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those which are
- 19 not." Id., slip op. at 36, Supplemental Reply Brief at 6. Respondent's argument does not compel
- 20 dismissal of this matter for several reasons.
- 21 As a general matter, 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) and 11 C.F.R. § 104.15 were not at issue in
- 22 Citizens United. This is significant not only because it limits the usefulness of applying the
- 23 language of the opinion in this matter, but also because a less stringent standard of scrutiny than

- that applied in Citizens United would apply to an examination of the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C.
- 2 § 438(a)(4). In Citizens United, the Supreme Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis because the
- facts involved restrictions on speech, i.e., 2 U.S.C. § 441b's ban of corporations and unions from
- 4 using general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that is an
- 5 "electioneering communication" or for speech that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a
- 6 candidate. However, the restrictions on the use or sale of FEC data for solicitation or
- 7 commercial purposes is not the same kind of restriction on political expression that was at issue
- 8 in Citizens United, and only an intermediate level of scrutiny would apply to a prohibition of
- 9 commercial use of FEC data. See Federal Election Commission v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 523 F. Supp.
- 10 523 (D.D.C. 1997) (intermediate scrutiny applied to First Amendment free speech challenge to
- 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) which generally prohibits commercial use and sale of FEC data). As a
- result, the Citizens United decision does not compel a particular result in this matter. Further,
- lower courts that have applied an intermediate level of scrutiny have upheld the constitutionality
- of the prohibition of commercial use of FEC data. Id.
- Second, Respondent's argument is further undercut by the fact that the regulation's media
  exemption found at 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(c) does not distinguish media from non-media
- 17 corporations solely on the basis of their status, but rather as a factor in the overall analysis of
- 18 whether or not FEC data is being used for impermissible commercial purposes, or some other
- 19 permissible purpose. The exemption allows the use of the FEC data by media entities only if the
- 20 principal purpose of such communication is not to communicate contributor information for
- 21 solicitation or other commercial purposes—the same use restrictions that are imposed on all
- 22 persons by the statute and Parts (a) and (b) of the regulation. The exemption is not contained in
- 23 the statute itself, but rather a creature of the statute's implementing regulation. If there were no

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- constitutional justification for treating media corporation differently in the context of 2 U.S.C.
- 2 § 438(a)(4), the result would be merely that the entity's media status would no longer be
- 3 considered as an element in the regulation's principal purpose analysis, but the remainder of the
- 4 analysis would remain the same a result that does not change the outcome in this matter.

The courts, when analyzing the regulatory media exemption, have considered the entity publishing the communication as one of many factors with respect to determining the principal purpose of the communication. For example, the court found that Legi-Tech's communication violated Section 438(a)(4) and did not meet the regulatory media exemption to the statutory prohibition despite the fact that Legi-Tech's parent company was owned by a diversified media company. Legi-Tech at 532 ( "What matters is not who owns Legi-Tech or the nature of that owner's businesses, but the principal purpose and type of communication in which the campaign contribution information is used. Even a corporation that is 'an organ of the press,'...,or otherwise in the newspaper or multi-media business, is not entitled to compile FEC campaign contributions lists for the primary purpose of a commercial sale of that information." Legi-Tech at 532. Respondent belatedly purports that its C/V feature has a compliance purpose; however, the regulation looks at the principal use of the FEC data. As discussed supra, the principal purpose of Aristotle's sale of the FEC data in CM-5's C/V feature was for solicitation and the commercial sale of its software upgrade.

Given that the courts have applied the regulatory media exemption equally to media and non-media corporations, the *Citizens United* language cited by Respondent in its Supplemental Reply Brief is inapplicable to the constitutional analysis of the statute and the Commission's regulation, and the Commission should enforce the regulation.

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1 We believe that Respondent's constitutional challenge is also undercut by the facts here.

- 2 Its purported compliance purpose of including the FEC data in its software is directly
- 3 contradicted by its initial marketing and user manuals which promoted solicitation of
- 4 contributors based on prior donations to other committees. Moreover, the Commission provides
- 5 this information to campaigns for free. Therefore, Aristotle's sale of the FEC data served no
- 6 measurable compliance purpose and overlaps with the disclosure of the information provided for
- 7 free by the Commission in accordance with the Act. Last, Aristotle's argument that the C/V
- 8 feature deters corruption is contradicted by its characterization of the feature as difficult to use
- 9 and rarely used by its customers. Therefore, the statute and regulation are constitutional as
- 10 applied to the facts of this matter.

### D. The Commission's Enforcement Action Does Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause to the Fifth Amendment

14 Respondent argues that the Commission's enforcement of this action would violate the

- Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In order to
- prevail on an Equal Protection claim, Respondent must establish that similarly situated
- individuals are being treating differently and that the differential treatment is not justified.
- 18 See California Med. Association v. Federal Election Commission, 453 U.S. 182, 200
- 19 (U.S. Cal 1981). In support of its claim, Respondent cites to other enforcement matters, which it
- 20 alleges permitted for-profit list sales and other publication of FEC data for commercial purposes.
- 21 Reply Brief, at 52-55, citing to MUR 5155 (TRKC, Inc.), MUR 6065 (PoliticalBase.com), and
- 22 MUR 6053 (HuffingtonPost.com). However, Respondent ignores key facts of the other
- 23 enforcement cases, in which the regulatory exemption applied. 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(c). Most

- importantly, it also ignores that it cannot, and does not claim to fit within the media exemption.
- 2 See MUR 5625 Probable Cause Hearing Transcript at 27.
- In MUR 5155 (TRKC, Inc.), the Commission found reason to believe that TRKC, Inc.
- 4 violated 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4), but determined to take no further action. The facts of MUR 5155
- are distinguishable from the facts of this case. See MUR 5155 General Counsel's Report #3,
- dated May 3, 2006. TRKC is an Internet news and tracking service that assists media
- 7 organizations, corporations, trade associations, individuals and non-profit groups with data
- 8 collection, storing, transmission, linking, analysis and display of complex financial and political
- 9 information. TRKC had several Web sites that included free content and fee-based subscription
- 10 services. All fee-based information from the FEC was the same as that which was available for
- 11 free. Not only is TRKC the equivalent of a news purveyor, but because the FEC data was also
- 12 available through TRKC to the public without a subscription, what customers were really paying
- 13 for is an easier sorting of the information, the ability to sort the information themselves in a way
- that is useful to them, and to have access to other types of non-Commission information. Given
- all subscriber information was available for free, and not to help with solicitations, there was no
- 16 commercial purpose.
- 17 In MURs 6065/6053 the Commission found no reason to believe
- 18 www.Huffingtonpost.com and www.PoliticalBase.com violated 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) because
- both respondents were covered by the media exemption to the commercial use provision, and
- 20 neither was using FEC contributor information for commercial purposes. Respondents
- 21 HuffingtonPost.com and PoliticalBase.com are news and opinion websites and the principal
- 22 purpose for use of the FEC data was informational rather than commercial. Neither website
- 23 charged a fee or required users to subscribe to see the contributor information.

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1 HuffingtonPost.com accepts advertisements, but PoliticalBase.com did not at the time of the

2 Commission's decision. Both sites obtain their data from the Commission's disclosure database

and manipulate it to offer more ways to search it than available on the Commission website. For

example, both sites offer users the ability to search federal political contributions in a variety of

ways, including by occupation, address, employer, and name. In addition, both sites provide a

mapping feature, which pinpoints and displays a contributor's address and location on a map.

The Commission's decisions in MUR 5155 and MURs 6065/6053 are consistent with the proposed recommendations in the Aristotle matter, because although TRKC, Inc. did charge users for some services, the Commission data information available for a fee did not include any additional information with respect to individual donors that was not also readily available on the non-subscription side of the website. They merely provided the FEC contributor information and let users view it without charge - this is not a commercial purpose. In contrast, in addition to the commercial nature of Aristotle's business - provider of campaign management software -Aristotle sold the FEC data through its software upgrade to facilitate solicitations of contributions and only recently began offering a contribution look-up feature on its Web site for free that contains the same data as the subscription fee-based C/V feature in CM-5. Last, unlike the respondents in MURs 5155, 6065 and 6053, Aristotle marketed its product as helping with solicitations, and compiles donors' aggregate contributions that can be used by Aristotle's customers to help campaigns determine who the "big givers" are so that the campaigns can ask those donors for the maximum amount of money that the donor has given to other campaigns in the past. By contrast, the respondents in the previous MURs did not market their products as solicitation assistance tools and did not aggregate donor's contributions, thereby lessening the chance of solicitation based on an individual's history of giving to other

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- campaigns. As noted previously, the respondents' communications in MURs 5155, 6065 and 1
- 6053 fit into the media exemption, whereas Aristotle's software product cannot. 2
  - E. Aristotle International, Inc. Knowingly and Willfully Sold and Used Individual Contributor Information Obtained from Commission Sources in Violation of 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4)

Attachment 2 is a timeline of events comparing Aristotle's activity and FEC actions in relation to this matter. Aristotle did not take any corrective action with respect to its marketing of the C/V feature as a solicitation tool and failure to include disclaimer warnings on its product until it became aware of the Commission's draft Advisory Opinion in response to NGP's request. Moreover, some marketing of the feature as a solicitation tool continued, not all sales contracts contained disclaimers, the manuals were not corrected, and the fliers still contained solicitation language and no disclaimer warnings after the issuance of AO 2004-24. On www.internetarchive.org, we located a PowerPoint presentation on Aristotle's website as late as November 2005. The marketing of the feature as a solicitation tool began in April 2004, and

16 gradually continued until completely deleted in November 2005. The PowerPoint presentation 17 appearing on Aristotle's website on November 2, 2005 continued to tout the feature as a solicitation tool. Attachment 1. As a technology company, its website advertising was 18 particularly important. Aristotle did not take steps to fully rectify these actions until well after it 19 became aware that NGP filed a complaint with the FEC about this activity.

While the Commission should encourage new technologies, entities are proscribed by the Act from commercial use of the data campaign committees must submit to the Commission. Aristotle's sale of the FEC data serves no measurable compliance purpose. Given these factors, we recommend that the Commission find probable cause to believe Aristotle International, Inc.

knowingly and willfully violated 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4). 25

MUR 5625 (Aristotle International, Inc.) General Counsel's Report #3 Page 36

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ı	V.	REC	<u>OMMENDATIONS</u>	
2 3 4 5		1.	Find probable cause to believe As willfully violated 2 U.S.C. § 438	ristotle International, Inc. knowingly and (a)(4);
6		2.		
8		3.	Approve the appropriate letters.	1
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23				Christine C. Gallagher
24				Attorney
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26	Atta	chments	•	

1. PowerPoint Presentation Appearing on Aristotle's Website, November 2, 2005







contributors and supporters have given to others. Although this data is Campaign Manager 5 allows you to easily conform your fundraising to directly available from state agencies and the FEC, its reference in Only Campaign Manager 5 can tell you how much your existing state and federal compliance standards.

also get important details such as telephone number, address corrections registered voter file. Pull up the name of any of your contacts, and you'll from the post office, names of spouse or family members, party ID and keeping your database up-to-date with the most accurate information vote history. This saves you thousands of dollars and many hours by All of your contacts are cross-referenced to Aristotle's enhanced US available in Aristotle's nationwide voter file.


Discover contributions without the credit checks, personal guarantees, accept and process unlimited MasterCard, Visa, American Express or Campaign Manager 5 gives your organization the ability to instantly merchant accounts or monthly fees. If you use you own credit card company accounts, Campaign Manager 5 will record and report the contributions accurately.

meet their goals. Integrated Web Fundraising with Affiliate Marketing (like fundraising operation, showing exactly how much was promised, and who Amazon.com) brings in contributions from like-minded supporters from has delivered. Powerful predictive fundraising helps your finance team Fundraising, Pledge, and Event Tracking gives you a professional out-of-state

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Unconditional compilance Guarantee, Aristotie's Campaign Manager 5 is the only software program for campaigns and PACs that comes with a 100% Unconditional Guarantee of Compilance with all state and federal campaign finance disclosure laws. Skilled, professional toll-free telephone support is always available 24 hours a day 7 days a week.

For more information about this exciting new software release, Campaign Manager 5, please contact your Aristotic Sales Representative at 800-296-2747.

Privacy Policy

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## ARISTOTLE

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Reasons

Why



Campaigns

Choose

Campaign

Manager 5


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### Raise More Money. Reason #1:

Only Campaign Manager 5 has a seamless interface to millions of detailed contribution records.

han soliciting a contri

Raise more money with Campaign Manager 5.



## Reason #2:

## Information is Power.

Campaign Manager 5 integrates information from the highly accurate Aristotle US Registered Voter File.

This tells you the birthday, phone number, party ID, or demographics of records in your database instantly.


Updated monthly by the Post Office, bad addresses are a thing of the past.


Now your soffware and voter file are working together.

A complete solution.



the US Voter File.





## Reason #3:

## Sticking to the Plan.

Foery campaign needs a clar. Getting your imance team to keep their goals is half the battle.

Janspaign Manager 6 will revolutionize your fun fraisin by tracking pledges made ar

Allocating you to guve produit icher eredit is due And helong insure that provessed made are checked.

Everyone benefits, when they stick to

the plan.

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### Reason #4:

# Pre-approved for Credit Cards.


Jack and the Park Radio

Campaign Manager 5 is the only FEC-approved software program, pre-approved to accept American Express, MasterCard, Discover 8 Visa contributions.

nmodiately accept confribations made with a credit card without any bank paperwork or quarantees soling over the physical trades or at events.

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There is no bether that its inside there's money in the part for final push.



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### Reason #5:

# 100% Compliance Guaranteed.

A CHANCE SAME AND PARTY OF

Aristotle is the only company to back its products with a 199 complance juliantee.

Fremaly customer support is alcravs available, foll-froy, 24 Hours a day, 7 days a week.


One phone call gets you an immediate answer from a real person knowledgeable in State and Federal reporting.

nat's why our customerisers on is rated #1 by pampaigns. FAC and grassroots groups.



## 5 Reasons Campaigns Choose Campaign Manager 5.

- . Raise More Money.
- 2. Information is Power.
- 3. Sticking to the Plan.
- Pre-Approved for American Express.
   MasterCard. Visa and Discover Contributions.
- 5. 100% Guaranteed.



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